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Abstract. Credentials are an indispensable means for service access
control in electronic commerce. However, regular credentials such as
X.509 certiﬁcates and SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcates do not address user pri-
vacy at all, while anonymous credentials that protect user privacy are
complex and have compatibility problems with existing PKIs. In this pa-
per we propose privacy-preserving credentials, a concept between regular
credentials and anonymous credentials. The privacy-preserving creden-
tials enjoy the advantageous features of both regular credentials and
anonymous credentials, and strike a balance between user anonymity
and system complexity. We achieve this by employing computer servers
equipped with TPMs (Trusted Platform Modules). We present a detailed
construction for ElGamal encryption credentials. We also present XML-
based speciﬁcation for the privacy-preserving credentials.
1 Introduction
It is well accepted that user privacy is an important issue in online services such
as electronic commerce [1]. User privacy concerns actually result from the fact
that online systems routinely enforce access control over the services they provide
in order to distinguish qualiﬁed and illegitimate users, and current standard
technologies implement access control/authorization through user identiﬁcation.
For example, a user provides her credential (e.g., a X.509 certiﬁcate) to a service
provider in order to attest her qualiﬁcation for the service in question. As a
result, the service provider is enabled to log transactions and derive accurate
dossiers of user activities.
Currently, there are mainly three kinds of credentials in PKI: X.509 certiﬁcates
[17], SPKI/SDSI authorization certiﬁcates [12,23], and attribute certiﬁcates [18].
A X.509 certiﬁcate binds a public key to a globally unique user identity so as to
enable the use of public keys at the discretion of user identities. X.509 certiﬁcates
are thus known as identity certiﬁcates. In access control, however, it has been
noted that a user’s identity is almost never a factor in an authorization decision
[11], and what really counts is whether the user has the required permissions.
This gives rise to the concept of SPKI/SDSI authorization certiﬁcate and at-
tribute certiﬁcate: an authorization certiﬁcate binds a set of user attributes that
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convey access permissions to a public key, while an attribute certiﬁcate binds
user attributes to an identity. These standard credentials do not deal with user
privacy1.
Anonymous credentials (e.g., [7,6,9,8]) can be viewed as a special class of cer-
tiﬁcates for authorization. Instead of directly passing a credential to the veriﬁer
as with the regular credentials, use of anonymous credentials is through zero-
knowledge proof protocols [14], where the veriﬁer ends up learning whether or
not the credential satisfy its access control policies but nothing beyond this fact.
Unlinkability is a core feature of anonymous credentials, i.e., transactions using
the same credential cannot be linked. While anonymous credentials oﬀer strong
user privacy protection, they have not been widely used in real world appli-
cations. A main reason was believed to be that they are not compatible with
the existing PKIs [5]. Other reasons may attribute to the use of zero-knowledge
proof techniques, which results in: (1) limited expressiveness. Zero-knowledge
proof techniques are not eﬀective in conveying complex relations between user
attributes and access control policies; (2) low eﬃciency. Zero-knowledge proof
techniques are in general expensive in terms of both computation and communi-
cation, and this makes it particularly diﬃcult for resource-constraint users (e.g.,
wireless users) to use anonymous credentials.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we propose privacy-preserving credentials,
which represent a concept between regular credentials and anonymous creden-
tials. Speciﬁcally, the privacy-preserving credentials are built upon and thus
compatible with regular credentials, but endeavor to achieve unlinkability as
of anonymous credentials. For eﬃciency reasons, we avoid any zero-knowledge
proof technique; rather, we manage to achieve relaxed unlinkability (see Section 3
for details). As a result, the privacy-preserving credentials enjoy the advantages
of both regular credentials and anonymous credentials: compatibility with exist-
ing PKI and rich expressiveness, of regular credentials, and privacy-enhancing
feature of anonymous credentials. Moreover, we implement partial disclosure of
sensitive attributes based on “need to know”.
A key challenge in constructing the privacy-preserving credentials lies in the
public keys embedded in credentials, which are globally unique quantities. The
public keys cannot be disclosed to the service providers, but they must still be
usable for data encryption or data authentication. We solve this problem by
running a specialized software program, PEM (Privacy Enhancing Module), at
the sever side, which composes “chameleon public keys” by blinding the original
public keys without compromising the usages of the keys. Trustworthiness of
PEM is maintained through a TPM under the auspice of Trusted Computing
Group (TCG) speciﬁcations [28] (more details on TCG/TPM are provided in
Appendix). We design our protocol using TPM commands Version 1.2 [29].
Organization. We review related work in Section 2, followed by discussions on
the concept, general construction, and security features of our privacy-preserving
1 While a SPKI/SDSI authorization certiﬁcate does not necessarily contain a user
identity, the public key associated with the certiﬁcate uniquely indicates a user,
which links all the transactions under the same certiﬁcate.
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credentials in Section 3. An instantiation of the credentials for ElGamal public
encryption keys is presented in Section 4. We implement credential speciﬁcation
using XML in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
Our work is clearly closely related to anonymous credentials (e.g., [7,6,9,8]).
Anonymous credentials achieve unlinkability, which to our belief is an essential
factor for any privacy-enhancing technique. As such, the privacy-preserving cre-
dentials we propose are endeavored to provide unlinkability. However, in order
not to compromise eﬃciency, we shall avoid zero-knowledge proof techniques in
our construction, so the privacy-preserving credentials attain relaxed unlinkabil-
ity, striking a balance between user anonymity and system complexity.
Trust negotiation (e.g.,[24,31]) is a procedure whereby a user and a server
establish trust through a gradual exchange of the user’s credential attributes
and the server’s access control policies. The technique is on the one hand to
protect sensitive attributes of users from unqualiﬁed server, while on the other
to protect the server’s access control policies against illegitimate users. After
a successful negotiation, the server obtains the user credential. In other words,
trust negotiation is not meant to protect user privacy from qualiﬁed server. In
contrast, our privacy-preserving credentials are designed to protect user privacy
from the server, be it qualiﬁed or unqualiﬁed.
The Oblivious Attribute Certiﬁcates proposed in [20] work in such a way that
a user gets a service iﬀ the attributes stored in her certiﬁcate satisfy the policies
of the server, yet the server learns nothing about these attribute values. While
the Oblivious Attribute Certiﬁcates do not rely on zero-knowledge proof tech-
niques, they still have the limitations of anonymous credentials such as restricted
expressiveness and low eﬃciency. The objective of our privacy-preserving creden-
tials is not concealing attribute values from the server, but disclosing only those
satisfying “need to know”. Other certiﬁcate-based access control relates to ours
include Secret Handshakes [3], Hidden Credentials [15], and Oblivious Signature
Based Envelope [19]. They however work in diﬀerent ways: the server sends an
encrypted message to a user, and the user can decrypt iﬀ she has a certiﬁcate
having attribute values speciﬁed by the server’s access control policies; but the
server does not learn whether or not the user has such a certiﬁcate. [5] suggested
a novel method to extend standard attribute certiﬁcates so as to achieve user
privacy, but the resultant certiﬁcates are essentially linkable.
3 Privacy-Preserving Credentials
3.1 Concept
Conceptually, a credential contains a subject together with a set of subject at-
tributes speciﬁed by name/value pairs (e.g., Issuer/ca, Age/28, Role/professor),
attached with a digital signature over the credential content; the signature is
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generated by a Credential Issuer using his private key, and the authenticity of
the credential can be veriﬁed by using the Issuer’s public key. In the context
of authorization, the objective of a credential is to attest that the subject indi-
cated (directly or indirectly) by the public key possesses the speciﬁed attributes,
and authorization decisions must be made to the public key based upon the
attributes. We point out that the subject of a SPKI/SDSI authorization certiﬁ-
cate is directly the public key contained in the certiﬁcate; while the subject of
a X.509 certiﬁcate refers to the user identity in the certiﬁcate, but what is re-
ally eﬀective in authorization is the public key, and the access control decisions
are eventually granted to the public key. It is important to observe that in a
credential, the public key, i.e., the credential subject, must be a globally unique
quantity, whereas other attributes are not necessarily unique. For example, a
SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcate includes attributes such as Issuer, Delegation, Authoriza-
tion and Validity, but none of them would have values that are unique. This is
logical since in virtually any application in practice, there must be a group of
users share an attribute value or a combination of attribute values, and thus
have the same permission. As a result, even a user discloses the attribute values
in her credential to a server while without revealing her public key (and possibly
other unique quantities), the server is still not able to accurately link the current
transaction to the user’s previous transactions.
Based upon this observation, we propose the concept of privacy-preserving
credentials outlined in Figure 1. In particular, the privacy-preserving creden-
tials represent a kind of authorization tokens between regular credentials and
(a) Regular Credential
(b) Privacy-Preserving Credential
(c) Anonymous Credential
Fig. 1. Concept of Privacy-Preserving Credentials
anonymous credentials; regular credentials distinguish individual users, thereby
not protecting user privacy at all (shown in Figure 1(a)), and anonymous cre-
dentials achieve unlinkability and recognize users as the whole user population,
thereby fully protecting user privacy (shown in Figure 1(c)). The basic principle
of the privacy-preserving credentials works as follows: the credential user does
not reveal the credential subject (e.g., the public key and the user identity, and
other unique quantities) to the veriﬁer, and only discloses a minimal subset of
attributes that satisfy “need to know” requirement of the veriﬁer. As a result, the
veriﬁer distinguishes user cohorts among the whole user population (shown in
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Figure 1(b)), where a cohort comprises users who have the same attribute values.
In other words, the privacy-preserving credentials achieve relaxed unlinkability
in the sense that the veriﬁer can link an individual user to a cohort of users. The
size of the cohorts relates only to the attribute values exposed to the veriﬁer,
and there exists the possibility that some particular users could be recognized
as long as the size of the cohorts they belong to is one, but the majority of users
cannot be diﬀerentiated (further discussion is given in subsection 4.3).
3.2 General Construction
The way we achieve privacy-preserving credentials is to use the credentials upon
servers that are equipped with TCG-conformant TPMs. TPM at the server to-
gether with the Privacy Enhancing Module (PEM) constitutes a trusted com-
puting platform that cannot be tampered with regardless of software or physical
attacks (see Figure 2). PEM is a specialized software taking charge of enhanc-
ing user privacy, and users trust it to execute certain functions and not reveal
information to the server. PEM is a protected application under the auspices of
TPM. According to the TCG speciﬁcations, TPM takes integrity measurement
of PEM and reports the integrity metrics to remote users through attestation.
As a result, unless TPM is tampered with, the server cannot compromise PEM.
It should be noted that while PEM colocates with the server, it essentially act
as an extension of the user side.
Access Control
Module
TPM
Chameleon PK
Server
User
S
u
b
j
e
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td
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t
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Attribute
data
PEM
Trusted Computing Platform
Confidential channel
Open channel
Fig. 2. General Construction of Privacy-Preserving Credentials
Our general construction works as follows. We partition the content of a cre-
dential into two parts: one is subject data, and the other is attribute data. The
subject data, denoted as SubjDTA, include the data that uniquely indicate a
subject, e.g., the public key, the unique user name if any, the digital signature
over the credential (denoted as credSIG), and possibly some other data (e.g., the
credential serial number if any, and some auxiliary data that are necessary for
the veriﬁcation of credSIG). The attribute data, denoted as AttrbDTA, include
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all the subject attributes that aﬀect access control decisions. As we made it clear
the attribute data almost never uniquely identify a user, since it is unlikely that
the attribute values in a credential are unique to a single user. As such, our way
to achieve privacy-preserving credentials is that the attribute data are submit-
ted to the server (precisely to the access control module that manages access
control), but the subject data are given to PEM, shown in Figure 2.
The main task of PEM is to examine the validity of the credential, and derive
a chameleon public key from the public key contained in SubjDTA and pass it
to the access control module if the credential is valid. The access control module
is an integral part of the server, responsible for evaluating the attribute values
against its access control policies and making the ﬁnal authorization decision.
In our system, the server actually entrusts validation of credentials to PEM, but
still takes the full responsibility in enforcing access control; and PEM does not
in any way involve into the enforcement of access control. It is important to
note that while PEM takes root in TPM, it still uses the resources (computation
and storage) of the server platform for execution, so there is no eﬃciency penalty
upon PEM. TPM does not perform any application-speciﬁc function, only taking
charge of keeping the trusted state of PEM. Therefore, although TPM is strongly
limited by its computation and storage capability, the overall system does not
subject to the hardware constraint of the coprocessor.
3.3 Security Features
We desire the following security features upon the privacy-preserving credentials
in the above construction.
– Unforgeability: Unforgeability is a fundamental feature of any credential sys-
tem, which requires that nobody other than the Credential Issuer can issue
valid credentials.
– Partial disclosure of attributes: A credential normally includes some sensitive
attributes, and the credential user may be reluctant to reveal them to the
veriﬁer beyond “need to know”. A user thus should be enabled to choose to
disclose only the attributes that are absolutely necessary for the fulﬁlment
of the server’s access control requirements. The server should not be able to
learn the hidden attribute values.
– Relaxed Unlinkability: The server should not be able to link transactions by
inspecting the subject data that could obviously lead to linkability, and the
extent of linkability is only dependent on the attribute values disclosed by
the user. This suggests that the channel from the user to PEM (dote line in
Figure 2) must be conﬁdential against the server.
– Usability of public keys: In certiﬁcate-based access control, an authorization
decision is often made to the public key contained in a credential, which is
either for the purpose of data encryption or data authentication. We know
that for any online service, access control is the ﬁrst step whereby the server
determines whether the user who uses a credential has the permission to
the service in question; and what after access control is the service provision
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procedure, where the public key of the credential must be used for either data
encryption or veriﬁcation of data signed by the user. The privacy-preserving
credentials thus must not disable the usage of the public keys.
Goals of Adversary: Adversary behaviors towards the privacy-preserving cre-
dentials include: users may wish to break the unforgeability feature to forge
credentials, and to defeat non-repudiation of digital signatures; the server may
attempt to compromise partial disclosure of attributes by inferring the attribute
values of hidden attributes, as well as to compromise relaxed unlinkability by
linking individual users.
4 Concrete Instantiation
In this section, we give a concrete instantiation of the privacy-preserving creden-
tials upon TPM-augmented servers, according to the above general construction.
We know that the public key contained in a credential may correspond to either
public key encryption or digital signature, but for limit of space we only instan-
tiate ElGamal type digital signature credentials. Our instantiation can also be
extended to Elgamal public key encryption credentials and even RSA credentials.
4.1 Preliminaries
We shall use the following notations in the sequel. p, q, g are parameters of El-
Gamal public key encryption scheme, where p, q are two large primes such that
q|p − 1, and g ∈ Z∗p is of order q. h(.) is a collision resistant hash function such
as SHA-1. {.}k denote secret key encryption by a secret key k. EPK(.) denotes
public key encryption by a public key PK, and SSK(.) denotes signature signing
by a private key SK.
ElGamal Public Key Encryption. A user has a key pair (PK = y, SK = x),
where y = gx (mod p) is the public key and x is the private key. The encryption
of a message m generates a ciphertext (c1, c2), where c1 = gt (mod p), c2 =
myt = mgxt (mod p), with t ∈R Zq. The decryption by the user using x works
as c2/cx1 = mg
xt/gtx = m (mod p).
Merkle Hash Tree. The Merkle hash tree [22] is an eﬃcient method to au-
thenticate a set of data in such a way that given a signature over the whole
data set along with some auxiliary authenticating data, a subset of data can be
veriﬁed while in the absence of the remaining data. We illustrate the Merkle
hash tree by a simple example shown in Figure 3, which is to authenticate a set
of data {d1, d2, d3, d4}.
The construction of the Merkle hash tree is as follows: each leaf node of the tree
is assigned a hash value of a datum, so the values represented by the leaf nodes are
h1 = h(d1), h2 = h(d2), h3 = h(d3), h4 = h(d4), respectively. The value of each
internal node including the root node is derived from its child nodes. For example,
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h1=h(d1)
h12 h34
h0
h2=h(d2) h3=h(d3) h4=h(d4)
Fig. 3. Construction of Merkle Hash Tree
the value of node h12 is h12 = h(h1||h2), where h(.) is a collision-resistant one-
way hash function and || denotes concatenation. Similarly, h34 = h(h3||h4) and
h0 = h(h12||h34). With a signature issued upon the root value h0, any subset of the
data set can be authenticated with the help of some auxiliary authenticating data
while without disclosing the remaining data. For example, d1 can be authenticated
by given the authenticating data h2 derived from d2 and h34 derived from d3 and
d4, while in the absence of d2, d3 and d4; d1 and d2 can be authenticated if the
authenticating data h34 is given, while without knowing d3 and d4. The eﬃciency
of the Merkle hash tree rests with the fact that the number of the authenticating
data is linear to log2 N , where N is the size of the whole data set. It is clear that
given a root value of a data set, it is computationally infeasible to ﬁnd a diﬀerent
data set that has the same root value, which amounts to the security of the Merkle
hash tree method.
4.2 Protocol
Security Assumptions
– The hardware layer of TPM is tamper resistant regardless of hardware at-
tacks and software attacks by any party.
– PEM is running in a protected execution environment, within which dif-
ferent applications run in isolation, free from observed or compromised by
other processes running in the same protected partition, or by processes in
any insecure partition that may exit in parallel. TPM deﬁned by the TCG
speciﬁcations itself does not suﬃce to aﬀord this kind of protected execution
environments, but a TPM with slightly extended mechanisms, such as the
Intel’s LaGrande Technology (LT) [16], can achieve this objective.
Overview. Let us ﬁrst give some insights on our instantiation. First, the main
challenge in constructing the privacy-preserving credentials is to simultaneously
achieve relaxed unlinkability and usability of public keys. The feature of relaxed
unlinkability requires the public key in a credential to be hidden from the server,
while the feature of usability of public keys suggests the server must use the pub-
lic key in the subsequent service provision procedure for either data encryption or
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data authentication. Our solution is that PEM composes and gives a “chameleon
public key” by “blinding” the actual public key to the server such that the us-
ability of the public key is enabled, yet the server is not able to compute the
actual public key.
Second, to enable a user to selectively disclose credential attributes (i.e., par-
tial disclosure of attributes), we organize the content of a credential into a Merkle
hash tree, and the credential signature credSIG by the Credential Issuer is is-
sued upon the root value of the Merkle hash tree. Note that credSIG is a unique
quantity, so it must be hidden from the server. In fact, it is included in SubjDTA,
and never revealed to the server.
Third, TPM is responsible for integrity measurement and reporting of the
platform including the protected software, PEM. In particular, PCR values of
TPM record the integrity metrics of the platform from booting, to loading of
operation system, to loading of PEM. Before sending a credential to the server,
a user must ﬁrst make sure that the protected computing platform is running in
the expected status. TPM reports the platform conﬁguration and status through
platform attestation (it will be clear shortly how our protocols implement plat-
form attestation).
Finally, recall the general construction that to achieve relaxed unlinkability,
the subject data sent to PEM must be through a conﬁdential channel against
the server. We thus suppose PEM has a certiﬁed key pair (PKPEM , SKPEM)
that corresponds to a standard public key encryption scheme, so that one can
encrypt and send messages to it using the public key, and the server cannot
decrypt and learn the messages. To achieve better security, we protect the secret
key SKPEM by sealed storage of TPM (invoking TPM Seal to seal SKPEM ),
and the integrity metrics of the platform is bound with the seal.
Based on these ideas,we next give a protocol to construct the privacy-preserving
credentials that contain ElGamal public keys for encryption.
ElGamal Public Key Encryption Credentials. We suppose a user Alice
has an ElGamal key pair (PKA = y = gx (mod p), SKA = x), and the public
key contained in her credential is thus PKA. Moreover, without loss of general-
ity, we suppose Alice needs to submit a subset of her credential attributes to a
server in order to access a service. In such a case, the attribute data AttrbDTA
comprises this subset of attribute values, while the auxiliary authenticating data
that are derived from the hidden attribute values should be included in the sub-
ject data SubjDTA (see the general construction). We have to hide the auxiliary
authenticating data of the hidden attributes from the server, since otherwise the
server could infer the hidden attribute values in case the domains of the hid-
den attributes are small. To see this, suppose the server is given the auxiliary
authenticating data d34 in order to authenticate d1 and d2 in Figure 3. While
the server is not able to directly get d3 and d4 from d34, it can enumerate every
value in the domains of d3 and d4 to ﬁnd out the actual values that amount to
d34, as long as the domains are small.
For a public key encryption credential, the public key PKA will be used by
the server to send sensitive data to Alice in the subsequent service provision
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procedure. In our context, the server should not directly get PKA, and PEM
composes a chameleon public key in order to conceal PKA. The protocol for
platform attestation and credential processing is described as follows (A → B : m
denotes that entity A sends m to B).
1. Alice → PEM: Attestation Request, RA. RA is a nonce generated by Alice.
2. PEM → TPM: TPM Quote(h(RA||IDS)||indx(I)). The TPM Quote com-
mand instructs TPM to attest the platform status. The parameters given
to this command include the indices of the PCRs that record the platform
integrity metrics, I. TPM Quote may also be given 160 bits of externally
supplied data which, in our case, is the hash value of RA and the server ID
IDS .
3. TPM → PEM: SAIK(h(RA||IDS)||I). TPM returns a signature upon
h(RA||IDS)||I issued using its AIK.
4. PEM → Alice: I, SAIK(h(RA||IDS)||I), AIK certiﬁcate. PEM sends plat-
form integrity metrics I, the signature, and AIK certiﬁcate to Alice.
5. Alice: ﬁrst checks the validity of SAIK(h(RA||IDS)||I); then checks
h(RA||IDS) to ensure the message is fresh; ﬁnally decides whether the in-
tegrity metrics I represents a trustworthy state of the platform. From I,
Alice can know whether PEM has been compromised or not, and whether it
is running as expected.
6. Alice → PEM: AttrbDTA, c. If all checks pass, Alice encrypts SubjDTA
using PKPEM , the public key of PEM, to generate c = (EPKPEM (k),
{SubjDTA}k), where k is a random secret key for a standard secret key
encryption scheme. Then Alice sends AttrbDTA and c to PEM.
7. PEM → TPM: TPM Unseal(SKPEM ). PEM instructs TPM to unseal
SKPEM . SKPEM is unsealed only if the platform is in the agreed state,
i.e., the integrity metrics I matches the PCR values stored together with the
protected SKPEM at the time TPM Seal was invoked.
8. TPM → PEM: SKPEM . TPM returns SKPEM to PEM.
9. PEM: decrypts c using SKPEM to get k, and decrypts {SubjDTA}k using k
to get SubjDTA; then veriﬁes the authenticity of the credential by checking
the validity of credSIG included in SubjDTA:
(a) credSIG is valid: PEM picks a random blinding element α ∈R Zq and
composes a chameleon public key PK ′A = g
αPKA = gx+α (mod p); it then
encrypts α using PKA to generate c′ = EPKA(α), and sends AttrbDTA,
PK ′A, c
′, and VALID (a symbol indicating the credential is valid), to the
server (precisely to the access control module of the server).
(b) credSIG is invalid: PEM sends INVALID (a symbol indicating the cre-
dential is invalid) to the server.
10. Server: If receiving INVALID, it simply rejects Alice and aborts the trans-
action; otherwise, it evaluates AttrbDTA against its access control policies
to determine whether the permission is granted to the user. If the permis-
sion is granted, the server sends c′ to the user, and will use PK ′A for data
encryption in the subsequent service provision.
Privacy-Preserving Credentials 187
11. Alice: if granted access permission and receiving c′, she decrypts c′ to get α,
and computes and uses SK ′A = SKA + α = x + α (mod q) as her private
key in the service provision procedure. (PK ′A, SK
′
A) clearly constitutes a
valid ElGamal key pair.
4.3 Security Analysis
We next discuss how the above instantiation achieve the security features in
Section 3.
Unforgeability. Unforgeability of credentials is trivial due to the security of
the Merkle hash tree and the digital signature of the Credential Issuer.
Partial disclosure of attributes. The feature of partial disclosure of attributes
is also clear, since a credential is signed by the Credential Issuer upon the root
value of the Merkle hash tree organized by the content of the credential, so the
user is enabled to only reveal a subset of attributes that satisfy the server’s access
control policies. Furthermore, the server cannot see the auxiliary authenticating
data derived from the hidden attributes, thereby learning nothing on the hidden
attributes even their domains are small.
Relaxed Unlinkability. Clearly, relaxed unlinkability is achieved by the ap-
proach that the server is not allowed to inspect the subject data SubjDTA that
obviously leads to linkability (all unique quantities including credSIG are in-
cluded in SubjDTA). From the instantiation, the extent of linkability depends
totally on the attribute values contained in AttrbDTA, since the chameleon
public key and the ciphertext of the blinding element are random quantities.
“Relaxability” (relaxed unlinkability) comes from the fact that users would be
linked to cohorts, each consists of users having the same attribute values. It is
important to note that we do not rule out the possibility that some particular
users can be linked, in which case the size of the cohort a user belongs to is
1. For example, a particular user may have a set of attribute values distinct
from anyone else. We next give an analysis on the conditions under which no
individual user is linked.
Suppose a type of privacy-preserving credentials has κ attributes (attribute
1 to attribute κ), and attribute i takes vi values, i = 1..κ. Note that these vi
values do not necessarily constitute the domain of attribute i, and they are the
values that are actually assigned to users. There are thus
∏κ
i=1 vi combinations
of attribute values in total, and clearly each combination determines a cohort.
In order that no individual user is linked, there must be at least two users to
take every combination of the attribute values, i.e., the size of every cohort
must be at least 2. As such, there are at least 2
∏κ
i=1 vi users. Further, consider
each particular attribute: for each of the vi values of attribute i, it must occur
at least 2v1...vi−1vi+1...vκ = 2
∏κ
j=1,j =i vj times when in combination with the
remaining attributes, which suggests that there must be at least 2
∏κ
j=1,j =i vj
users to take the value. As a result, we have the following claim.
CLAIM. There would be no individual user be linked as long as the following
conditions are satisﬁed:
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1. There are at least 2
∏κ
i=1 vi users registered to the Credential Issuer; and
2. For each value of the vi values of attribute i, i = 1..κ, there are at least
2
∏κ
j=1,j =i vj users taking the value.
Of course, the second condition already implies the ﬁrst one. These conditions
can be used as a criteria to evaluate the relaxed unlinkability of the privacy-
preserving credentials.
Usability of public keys. The usability of public keys is determined by the
chameleon public keys and the corresponding private keys. It can be easily seen
that what we construct in the above instantiation is a valid ElGamal encryption
key pair.
4.4 Discussions
We discuss the advantages and limits of the privacy-preserving credentials. Our
constructions do not use any zero-knowledge proof technique, hence the privacy-
preserving credentials have eﬃciency advantage over anonymous credentials. We
do not give the exact comparison result, as this depends on the speciﬁc anony-
mous credential schemes to be compared, but a casual estimate on the overhead
of the privacy-preserving credentials is simply several operations of signature
generation/veriﬁcation and encryption/decryption (note that platform attes-
tation involves essentially no more than one signature signing operation and
one signature veriﬁcation operation.). Moreover, there is no major architectural
change at the user side, so we believe resource-constraint users such as mobile
devices will not be aﬀected in our system. A more appealing advantage is that
since the privacy-preserving credentials are totally compatible with regular cre-
dentials, they have no expressiveness problem; more importantly, this makes
them implementable directly upon existing standard PKIs. In contrast, a major
limit of anonymous credentials is their incompatibility with PKIs.
The main limit of the privacy-preserving credentials we can imagine is that
they have to use TPM at the server side. It should be noted that TPM can
only be trusted up to the level of its hardware tamper resistance, and should
be assumed to deter only the least resourceful attackers [13]. On the bright
side however, numerous techniques to take hardware tamper resistance and the
threat from the local host users into account in the design of trusted systems
have been studied extensively, and much progress has been made in recent years
(e.g., [21,25,26,27]). It is thus reasonable to expect that as tamper resistant
hardware becomes more widely adopted, high quality tamper resistant hardware
will become aﬀordable due to economy of scale.
5 Credential Speciﬁcation
We implement XML-based credential speciﬁcation for the privacy-preserving
credentials, compatible with the structure of regular credentials such as X.509
certiﬁcates and SPKI/SDSI authorization certiﬁcates. Observe that while the
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<DOCTYPE CashBank Customer[
<!ELEMENT CashBank Customer(issuer, validity, profession,
city, dateBirth, credLevel, cusID, publicKey, credSIG, extension)>
<!ELEMENT issuer ANY>
<!ELEMENT validity (#PCDATA|NULL)>
<!ELEMENT profession (#PCDATA|NULL)>
<!ELEMENT city (#PCDATA|NULL)>
<!ELEMENT dateBirth (#PCDATA|NULL)>
<!ELEMENT credLevel (HIGH|MEDIUM|LOW|NULL)>
<!ELEMENT extension (extAttr*)>
<!ELEMENT extAttr ANY>
<!ATTLIST extAttr attrSeq CDATA #REQUIRED
attrV CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!ATTLIST issuer XML:LINK CDATA #FIXED ”SIMPLE”
HREF CDATA #REQUIRED
signKey CDATA #REQUIRED>
signAlg CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!ATTLIST CashBank Customer cusID ID NULL>
<!ATTLIST CashBank Customer publicKey CDATA NULL)>
<!ATTLIST CashBank Customer credSIG CDATA NULL)>
]>
<CashBank Customer cusID=’NULL’ publicKey=’NULL’ credSIG=’NLL’>
<issuer HREF=’http://www.cashbank.com’
signKey=’2ABG64897HJ’ signAlg=’RSA’>
<validity> 01-10-1006 </validity>
<profession> software engineer </profesion>
<city> NULL </city>
<dateBirth> NULL </dateBirth>
<credLevel> MEDIUM </credLevel>
<extension>
<extAttr attrSeq= ’4’ attrV=’♦†‖‡’/>
<extAttr attrSeq= ’5’ attrV=’‖∅§∃℘§£’/>
<extAttr attrSeq= ’7’ attrV=’∅ c©√§‡¶’/>
<extAttr attrSeq= ’8’ attrV=’¶℘♣†’/>
<extAttr attrSeq= ’9’ attrV=’∞ℵ∂♥’/>
</extension>
</CashBank Customer>
Fig. 4. Example of Privacy-Preserving Template and Credential
exact ﬁelds contained in regular credentials may be diﬀerent, they have similar
structure, e.g., they usually include ﬁelds such as Serial Number, Issuer, Validity
Period, Subject Name, Public key, etc., and an Extension ﬁeld. Our basic idea for
constructing the privacy-preserving credentials is utilizing the Extension ﬁeld to
encode the data to be submitted to PEM. While we can directly extend the X.509
certiﬁcates or the SPKI/SDSI certiﬁcates by placing all the application-speciﬁc
attributes and the data intended for PEM in the Extension ﬁeld, the examples
we give below do not follow this method, simply for illustration purposes. XML
[30] has extensive support in practice, so the implementation of XML-based
speciﬁcation entitles the privacy-preserving credentials wider applicability. For
instance, we can use the privacy-preserving credentials in a trust negotiation
system that enforces P3P privacy policies.
To simplify the management of credentials, we deﬁne credential templates. A
credential template speciﬁes a type of credentials speciﬁc to a particular appli-
cation. We model a credential template as a XML DTD [30]. The upper part
of Figure 4 shows an example of a privacy-preserving credential template Cash-
Bank Customer. To facilitate partial disclosure of attributes, template ﬁelds are
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assigned a default value NULL, which is a special symbol indicating the ﬁeld
may be concealed from the server.
A credential is an instance of the credential template, specifying the attribute
values that characterize a user. A privacy-preserving credential is thus a valid
XML document conforming to the corresponding DTD credential template. The
lower part of Figure 4 gives an instance of the CashBank Constomer template.
The attributes to be concealed from the server are assigned the special sym-
bol NULL, and the auxiliary authenticating data derived from them accord-
ing to the Merkle hash tree are encoded in the “extension” ﬁeld. To simplify
credential parsing, each piece of auxiliary authenticating data is encrypted
as a separate extended attribute “extAttr”. In particular, the example cre-
dential in Figure 4 (lower part) is as follows: the cleartexts for cusID, pub-
licKey, and credSIG are removed, and the ciphertexts of them are encoded
in the extension ﬁled as “attrSeq= ’7’ attrV=’∅ c©√§‡¶”’, “attrSeq= ’8’
attrV=’¶℘	♣†”’, and “attrSeq= ’9’ attrV=’∞ℵ∂♥”’, respectively;
the ciphertext of the hidden attribute “city” is represented by “attrSeq= ’4’
attrV=’♦†‖‡	”’ and the hidden attribute “dataBirth” is encoded as “at-
trSeq= ’5’ attrV=’‖	∅§∃℘§£	”’.
6 Conclusions
The new initiatives of trusted computing by placing TPM at the server machine
are a promising paradigm in addressing user privacy in online services. Upon
such servers, we proposed privacy-preserving credentials that represent a con-
cept between regular credentials and anonymous credentials, in the sense that
the privacy-preserving credentials are compatible with regular credentials while
incorporating the privacy-enhancing features of anonymous credentials. We gave
concrete construction of the privacy-preserving credentials containing ElGamal
encryption keys for data encryption. We also implemented XML-based credential
speciﬁcation.
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Appendix: TCG/TPM
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [28] deﬁnes a set of speciﬁcations aiming
to provide hardware-based root of trust and a set of mechanisms to propagate
trust to applications as well as across platforms. The root of trust in TCG is
TPM (Trusted Platform Module), a tamper resistant secure coprocessor. TPM
provides cryptographic functions, such as random number generation and RSA
algorithms. Security mechanisms oﬀered by TPM include integrity measurement
and reporting, and sealed storage for secret data such as cryptographic keys.
We next give a brief introduction on them. A TPM contains a set of Platform
Conﬁguration Registers (PCRs). PCR values record the integrity and state of
a running platform from booting to loading of operation system to of loading
applications [26]. With the integrity measurement and storage, TPM (attesta-
tor) can attest to a remote challenging platform the integrity of the platform
under its protection through platform attestation. In particular, the challeng-
ing platform sends a challenge message to the attestator platform, who in turn
returns the related PCR values signed by its Attestation Identity Key (AIK);
the challenging platform veriﬁes this attestation by comparing the signed values
with expected values. The TPM command that instructs TPM to report the
signed PCR values is TPM Quote, whose input parameters specify the indices
of the PCRs to be reported. Attestation can also be anonymous through Direct
Anonymous Attestation [2].
TPM provides sealed storage that protect sensitive data with integrity values.
Besides applying an encryption key (public key encryption) to encrypt the data,
one or more PCR values are stored together with protected data during en-
cryption. Consequently, TPM releases a protected data only if the current PCR
values match those stored during encryption. The encryption key is protected
either by a storage root key (SRK) that resides within TPM or by a key pro-
tected by the SRK. This actually forms a key hierarchy with the root being the
SRK. The TPM commands that relate to sealed storage include TPM Seal and
TPM Unseal. The TPM Seal operation allows the invoking entity to explicitly
state the future “trusted” conﬁguration that the platform must be in for the
secret to be revealed. The TPM Seal operation also implicitly includes the rel-
evant platform conﬁguration (PCR values) when the TPM Seal operation was
performed. The TPM Unseal operation will reveal TPM Seal’ed data only if it
was encrypted on this platform and the current conﬁguration is the one named
as qualiﬁed to decrypt it.
